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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DARIUS MALAGA, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20030347-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his convictions for murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated 
robbery, and conspiracy to commit murder. This Court has pour-over jurisdiction 
pursuant § 78-2a-3(2)G) (Supp. 2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Does defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the 
reasonable doubt jury instruction fail where it rests on recently 
overturned case law? 
ILA. Was defense counsel ineffective in not challenging the jury instructions 
based on accomplice liability where the State did not rely on 
accomplice liability in convicting defendant? 
ILB. Was defense counsel ineffective in not challenging the murder elements 
instruction where the instruction included all theories relied upon by 
the State and the extra element only added to the State's burden? 
ILC. Was defense counsel ineffective in not challenging the conspiracy 
instructions where, taken together, they adequately instructed the jury 
as to the elements of that crime? 
III. Was defense counsel ineffective in not challenging the instruction 
concerning co-defendant's testimony where the instruction was a 
proper statement of the law? 
IV. Was defense counsel ineffective in not challenging the causation 
instruction where defendant never argued that an intervening cause led 
to Amy Tavey's death? 
V. Was defense counsel ineffective in not challenging the flight instruction 
where defendant has not shown that counsel's decision was anything 
other than a sound strategic one? 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal 
presents a question of law. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6, 89 P.3d 162.1 
VI. Did the trial court err in not making findings concerning mitigating 
factors before imposing the maximum mandatory sentence for 
aggravated kidnapping where the record supports the court's lack of 
findings? 
A trial court's sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State 
v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, \ 27, 55 P.3d 1131, cert denied, 63 P.3d 104 (Utah 2003). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are attached at Addendum A: 
United States Const. Amend VI; 
Utah Const, Art. I, § 12. 
defendant asks this Court to consider each of his jury instruction challenges for 
plain error and manifest injustice, as well as for ineffective assistance of counsel. See 
Aplt. Br. at 44-49. However, defendant affirmatively approved of the instructions at trial 
(R. 459:982). Thus, he waived any plain error or manifest injustice challenges to those 
instructions on appeal. See State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 62, 114 P.3d 551 ("A jury 
instruction may not be assigned as error, even if such instruction would otherwise 
constitute manifest injustice, 'if counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively 
represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction.'") (quoting 
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ 54, 70 P.3d 111). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of murder, a first degree felony, for the 
death of Amy Tavey, and one count each of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated 
robbery, both first degree felonies, and conspiracy to commit murder, a second degree 
felony, for crimes against Keith Williams (R. 76-79). After bindover, his case was 
consolidated with that of co-defendant Silia Olive (R. 142-45; R. 450:363). 
After a six-day jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged (R. 411-12). 
Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of five years to live for murder, fifteen 
years to life for aggravated kidnapping, nine years to life for aggravated robbery, and one 
to fifteen years for conspiracy (R. 420-21). Defendant timely appealed (R. 425-26). 
The supreme court transferred the matter to this Court for disposition (R. 429). 
The trial court then supplemented the record with an order addressing proposed jury 
instructions (R. 615-91). After defendant filed his opening brief, briefing was stayed 
pending a decision by the supreme court on an issue that could have been determinative 
of defendant's appeal. On June 7, 2005, the supreme court issued its decision in State v. 
Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305. The briefing schedule in this case was then reset. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
On May 3, 2002, co-defendant Silia Olive convinced her girlfriend to lure Keith 
Williams, a drug associate, to Olive's apartment so that Olive's friends, including 
2
 The facts are set forth in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State 
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 2, 10 P.3d 346. 
3 
defendant, could assault and kidnap him (R. 454:145-46, 213-14; R. 455:280). By the 
end of the night, Williams had been beaten up, robbed, tied up with duct tape, and forced 
into the trunk of his own car (R. 454:158; R. 455:376-78, 381, 387). Williams's 
girlfriend, Amy Tavey, who unexpectedly accompanied Williams to the apartment, had 
been kidnapped and murdered, her body dumped into the Jordan River (R. 454:150, 158-
59, 166-67, 199, 210, 212, 236-37; R. 455:329, 334-35, 362, 485). According to Olive, it 
was defendant's idea to lure Williams over to Olive's apartment (R. 457:823). 
On May 3, 2002, Amanda Miller was staying at the home of Olive's cousins, the 
Laos. Olive called Amanda for a favor and arranged to pick up Amanda later that 
evening (R. 454:140-42). Sometime after dark, Olive picked up Amanda. Olive was 
driving her boyfriend's white Buick. Defendant and Tony Pita were with her (R. 
454:137, 142-43; R. 457: 824). The four then drove to Olive's apartment, where they met 
up with Olive's boyfriend, Anthony Lavulo, and with William Raymond Wallace 
("Raymond") and Marguerite Lao ("Liti") (R. 454:144-145; R. 457: 826, 828). 
Once in the apartment, Olive asked Amanda to call Keith Williams ("Boss"), a 
drug dealer from whom Olive and Amanda had previously purchased crystal 
methamphetamine (R. 454:145-46, 214). Olive told Amanda to convince him to come 
over because they were planning to beat up and kidnap him (R. 454:146, 213; R. 
455:280). Defendant, Anthony, and Raymond walked in and out of the room as Olive 
told Amanda the plan (R. 454:214). After four or five attempts, Amanda was finally able 
to talk with Boss, who said he would come over as soon as he could (R. 454:148, 193). 
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Shortly before Boss arrived, he called and talked with Olive (R. 454:150). Boss 
informed Olive that his girlfriend, Amy Tavey, was with him and asked if it was okay for 
Amy to come up to the apartment with him (R. 454:150; R. 455:362). Olive told Boss to 
"go ahead and bring her" (R. 454:151; R. 455:363-64). 
When Boss arrived, he parked in the back of the building because he was not on 
good terms with "Liz," a drug dealer who sometimes stayed with Olive (R. 455:366). 
According to Boss, Liz had started a false rumor that he had shot at her (R. 455:367). 
After parking, Boss and Amy got out of the car and started walking towards 
Olive's apartment. Boss gave Amy his leather USA jacket to wear because she did not 
have a jacket (R. 455:368). As Boss and Amy came around the corner of the building, 
they saw Olive sitting on her third-floor patio smoking a cigarette. Boss joked with Olive 
briefly, and then walked with Amy up the stairs to Olive's apartment (R. 455:371-72). 
When Boss tried to open the door to the apartment, he was surprised to find the 
door locked. On prior occasions, the door had always been unlocked. Boss knocked and 
waited. A minute later, Olive answered the door, smiled and backed up (R. 455:372-73; 
R. 457:840). 
When Boss and Amy entered the apartment, "the smile just dropped from [Olive's] 
face" as she looked over Boss's shoulder (R. 454:156; R. 455:374). When Boss turned to 
see what Olive was looking at, defendant hit him over the head with a "silver-looking 
gun" (R. 455:310, 375; R. 457:842). Boss's head started to bleed, and he fell to the floor. 
5 
Immediately, the other males joined defendant in beating Boss (R. 454:157-58; R. 
455:376-78; R. 457:844-45). 
Defendant and Raymond then took Boss's wallet, necklace, ring, cell phone, 
watch, and car keys. Afterwards, defendant pulled Boss's black beanie over his eyes, 
duct taped his hands behind his back, and placed a strip of tape over his mouth. 
Defendant then pulled out his gun, placed it at the back of Boss's head, and took him to 
the bathroom (R. 455:379, 381, 383). Defendant told Boss that he "was going to f-k me 
in my ass," to "shut the f-k up," and that "he was going to kill me." Defendant said this 
was happening because he had heard that Boss had shot at Liz (R. 455:378-80, 411). 
Boss tried unsuccessfully to push Amy out the door (R. 455:378). When Amy's 
mouth dropped open, Olive came over and placed her hand over Amy's mouth (R. 
454:158, 199). Boss did not see Amy again (R. 455:383). 
Olive led Amy down the narrow hallway back to Olive's bedroom (R. 454:159; R. 
455:470; R. 457: 848). As Olive led Amy away, Amy was crying. When Amy asked 
Olive not to hurt her, Olive "just told her to be quiet" (R. 455:470-71; R. 457: 858). 
Soon, defendant called on Olive to help find Boss's car, which they then parked at 
the bottom of the stairs leading to the apartment (R. 454:219; R. 457:853). A few 
minutes later, defendant and Raymond picked Boss up and led him out of the apartment 
and down the stairs while defendant held a gun to Boss's back. Defendant then ordered 
Boss to get into the trunk of his car (R. 455:386-88). 
6 
When Olive re-entered her bedroom at about the same time, Amy was no longer 
wearing her leather jacket. Olive got a red "hoodie" out of her closet and told Amy to put 
it on (R. 454:161, 210; R. 457:860).3 Olive then told Amy to cover her head and face 
with the hood of the hoodie and led Amy out of the apartment to Anthony's white Buick 
(R. 454:166-67, 210, 212). Olive, Amanda, and Anthony got into the front seat of the car; 
Amy was placed in the back seat between Liti on her right and a pile of clothes on her 
left. Amy was still crying (R. 454:167; R. 455: 473-75). 
Before leaving, Olive asked defendant, who was driving Boss's car, to follow her 
because her license plates were expired and she did not want to get pulled over by the 
police (R. 457:867-68). Olive left the apartment complex and headed toward the Lao 
residence near the Jordan River (R. 454:168; R. 457:871). Defendant pulled up closely 
behind Olive's car and followed (R. 454:168). Soon thereafter, Boss was able to free his 
hands from the duct tape, pop the trunk, and escape undetected (R. 455:390-91). 
About fifteen minutes later, Olive's and Boss's cars arrived at the Lao house (R. 
454:168). During the ride, Olive told Amy that "if she kept her mouth shut then nothing 
was going to happen." Amy remained silent (R, 454:236-38; R. 455:475-76). 
As the two cars approached the Lao house, defendant pulled up next to Olive, told 
her to park, and drove off. Olive parked the car and got out briefly to let Amanda out (R. 
454:169; R. 455:477; R. 457:872). Amanda said good-bye and then walked into the Lao 
;A "hoodie" is a sweatshirt with a hood (R. 454:161-62). 
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house (R. 454:169-70; R. 456:510). Everyone else stayed in the car (R. 455:476,478). 
About 30 minutes later, Boss's car returned (R. 455:478; R. 457:882). 
Defendant got out of Boss's car and approached Olive's (R. 455:481; R. 457:885). 
Liti got out to meet defendant and asked if he was okay because he seemed very mad (R. 
455:482; R. 456:540). Ignoring the question, defendant continued to walk toward Olive's 
car and asked, "Where's the girl?" Liti told him that Amy was in the car (R. 455: 482). 
Defendant opened Olive's rear door, pulled Amy out of the car, and led her away 
holding the back of her arm. Liti got back into Olive's car with Olive and Anthony. A 
few minutes later, all three heard multiple gunshots. Liti just shook her head (R. 455:483-
84; R. 457:887-90). Inside the house, Amanda also heard the gunshots (R. 454:172, 235-
36). She looked out the window and saw the white Buick driving away (R. 454:232-34; 
R. 456:533-34). 
Amy's body was found floating on her left side next to the north shore of the 
Jordan River (R. 455:329). An autopsy revealed that she had been murdered by gunshots 
fired into her back that penetrated her heart and lungs. (R. 455:334-45). 
At about 4 a.m. that morning, defendant and Raymond arrived at the home of 
Loleni Tuaone, a friend, in Boss's car. Tuaone was there with his girlfriend, Kelli 
Kershaw, and two other friends (R. 456:565-68). Raymond asked for help in disposing of 
the car. Kelli drove her friend's car, with Raymond as a passenger. Defendant drove 
Boss's car (R. 456:569-71). Defendant dropped the car off in a field around 3200 West. 
8 
Raymond spent the night at Tuaone's; defendant left (R. 456:573). When Boss's car was 
located later that day, it looked as if someone had tried to light it on fire (R. 456:577-78). 
The next morning, Tuaone saw defendant again. Defendant told Tuaone that he 
had killed a girl the night before by a river in the Glendale area. Defendant said he had 
put the girl on her knees, shot her, and then rolled her into the river (R. 456:612, 614-16). 
After the murder, Amanda spent a night with defendant at a motel in Salt Lake 
City (R. 454:174-75). During the stay, Amanda saw a handgun under a pillow (R. 
454:175). It was the same handgun Amanda had seen at Olive's apartment on the night 
of the murder (R. 454:179). 
Meanwhile, Raymond called a friend, Brieanna Stell, to take him to a motel (R. 
456:591-92). Brieanna took him to a motel in Salt Lake City, where they met up with 
Amanda and defendant. The party then picked up Tony Pita and dropped off Amanda at 
the Lao house before driving to Las Vegas (R. 456:593-95). Brieanna recalled that 
defendant was leaving town because he was wanted by the police. When the party arrived 
in Las Vegas, Brieanna dropped the three men off at Raymond's cousin's house (R. 
456:602). Brieanna then returned to Salt Lake (R. 456:598-99). 
Olive and Anthony were arrested in Bountiful, Utah on May 5, 2002 (R. 457:715). 
Defendant, Tony, and Raymond were arrested in Las Vegas on or about May 13 (R. 
456:595, 637-41). In a statement given to police after he was arrested, defendant 
admitted that he had been drinking on the night of the murder (R. 456:649). He also 
9 
admitted assaulting Boss and then taping him up and putting him in the trunk. He also 
admitted that he was near the Jordan River that night (R. 456:643, 650-53, 656). 
Amy's purse and leather jacket were found in Olive's apartment (R. 455:450, 452-
53). The gun used to kill Amy was found in the Las Vegas apartment in which defendant, 
Raymond, and Tony had stayed (R. 457:686-87, 690-92, 759-62). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue I. Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in not challenging 
the reasonable doubt jury instruction. However, in making his claim, defendant relies on 
case law that has recently been overturned. Because defendant's claim does not survive 
under the new law, his claim fails. 
Issue II.A. Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in not 
challenging various elements instructions because the instructions failed to address 
accomplice liability even though that theory was originally included in the information. 
Defendant also claims counsel should have challenged the instructions defining 
accomplice liability as misleading. Defendant's first claim fails because nothing requires 
that jury instructions include all the theories alleged in the information. His second claim 
fails because the State did not rely on accomplice liability in convicting him. 
Issue ILB. Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in not 
challenging the murder elements instruction because the instruction failed to include the 
elements for depraved indifference murder even though that theory was originally 
included in the information. Defendant also claims counsel should have challenged a jury 
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instruction defining "grave risk of death" as improper. Finally, defendant claims counsel 
should have challenged the murder elements instruction because it included an element 
not actually required. 
Defendant's first contention fails because nothing requires that jury instructions 
include all the theories alleged in the information. Defendant's second contention fails 
because the "grave risk of death" instruction was superfluous to defendant's murder 
conviction. Defendant's third contention fails because the inclusion of an additional 
element in the murder charge merely added to the State's burden of proof. 
Issue ILC. Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in not 
challenging the conspiracy instructions because no single instruction contained both the 
elements of the crime and the provision that the State had to prove those elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Defendant's claim fails because the two conspiracy instructions, read 
together, adequately informed the jury of the law. 
Issue III. Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in not 
challenging a jury instruction directing the jury to consider co-defendant Olive's 
testimony as it would any other witness's even though Olive was an accomplice and 
informant. Defendant's claim fails because the instructions as a whole were adequate to 
inform the jury that it should receive Olive's testimony with caution. 
Issue IV. Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in not 
challenging the murder causation statute as inadequately defining "intervening cause." 
Defendant's claim fails, however, because the instruction was more favorable to 
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defendant than the one he now proposes and because the instruction was adequate for 
defendant to present his defense. 
Issue V. Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in not challenging 
the flight instruction because it did not contain specific language suggested in Utah case 
law. Defendant's claim fails because the instruction was sufficient for defendant to 
present his defense. 
Issue VI. Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error in imposing 
the maximum minimum mandatory sentence for aggravated kidnapping without making 
specific findings that defendant's age and familial support were mitigating factors. 
Alternatively, defendant claims his counsel was ineffective in not asking the court to find 
those factors as mitigating. However, the record does not establish either of these factors 
as necessarily mitigating. Under such circumstances, the trial court did not err, let alone 
obviously err, in not finding those factors in mitigation; nor was defense counsel 
ineffective in not presenting them. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
CLAIM BASED ON THE REASONABLE DOUBT JURY 
INSTRUCTION FAILS WHERE IT RESTS ON RECENTLY 
OVERTURNED CASE LAW 
Defendant claims the trial court committed plain error in giving the reasonable 
doubt jury instruction in this case. See Aplt. Br. at 27, 44-49. Alternatively, defendant 
claims his trial counsel was ineffective in not challenging the instruction. See id. 
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Defendant claims that the instruction violated State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 
1997), "because [it] did not contain the essential phrase 'proof beyond reasonable doubt 
obviates all reasonable doubt5 and did contain . . . impermissible language indicating that 
reasonable doubt is not one that is merely possible." Id. at 27. Defendant's claim fails 
because Robertson no longer governs. 
As previously stated, see fn. 1 supra, although defendant asks this Court to each of 
his jury instruction challenges for plain error and manifest injustice, as well as for 
ineffective assistance of counsel, see Aplt. Br. at 44-49, defendant affirmatively approved 
of the instructions at trial (R. 459:982). Thus, he waived any plain error or manifest 
injustice challenges to those instructions on appeal. See State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, f^ 
62,114 P.3d 551 ("A jury instruction may not be assigned as error, even if such 
instruction would otherwise constitute manifest injustice, 'if counsel, either by statement 
or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury 
instruction."') (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, TJ 54, 70 P.3d 111). 
The following reasonable doubt instruction was given in this case: 
You are instructed that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
that degree of proof that satisfies the mind and convinces the 
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. 
A reasonable doubt is not one that is merely possible, fanciful or 
imaginary, because most everything relating to human affairs is open 
to some possible doubt. But a reasonable doubt is one which is real 
and substantial: it is a doubt based upon reason and one which 
reasonable men and women would have upon a consideration of all 
of the evidence. It must arise from the evidence or the lack of 
evidence in the case. 
13 
(R. 398; Instr. 60) 
A. Ineffective assistance claims cannot be based on overturned law. 
To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must show 
both that "counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard 
of reasonable professional judgment" and that "counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 
76, Tf 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). 
However, when an ineffectiveness claim relies on recently overturned law, this Court 
need not consider whether defendant has established the first prong of the Strickland test 
because defendant cannot demonstrate the second prong. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 
U.S. 364, 369-72 (1993); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 392 (2000). 
In Fretwell, Fretwell argued that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to 
the state's use of an element of the crime as an aggravating factor at Fretwell's capital 
murder sentencing hearing where, at the time of the hearing, a federal circuit court 
decision in that jurisdiction directly supported Fretwell's claim. Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 
364, 367. Although the state courts rejected Fretwell's claim, the federal district court 
granted Fretwell habeas relief, concluding that his trial counsel "'had a duty to be aware 
of all law relevant to death penalty cases'" and his "failure to make the . . . objection 
amounted to prejudice under Strickland." Id. at 367. (citation omitted). The federal court 
of appeals affirmed, "even though it had two years earlier overruled its [prior] decision 
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. . . in light of [an intervening Supreme Court] decision." Id. at 368. The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari. Id. 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court considered "whether counsel's failure to make an 
objection in a state criminal sentencing proceeding—an objection that would have been 
supported by a decision which subsequently was overruled—constitutes 'prejudice' 
within the meaning of our decision in Strickland." Id. at 366. The Court held that it did 
not. Id. In explaining its holding, the Court noted that "the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel exists 'in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.'" Id. at 368 
(citation omitted). Thus, "the right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not 
for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a 
fair trial." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court held: 
Because the result of the sentencing proceeding in this case 
was rendered neither unreliable nor fundamentally unfair as a 
result of counsel's failure to make the objection, we answer 
the question in the negative. To hold otherwise would grant 
criminal defendants a windfall to which they are not entitled. 
Id. at 366. In other words, an ineffectiveness claim based on the failure to raise an 
objection that has since been deemed invalid fails because defendant cannot show that 
"the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable," i.e., that he was 
prejudiced by counsel's performance. Id. at 369-70, 372. To hold otherwise would 
"grant the defendant a windfall to which the law"—which has now presumably been 
correctly decided—"does not entitle him." Id. at 370. 
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B. Robertson, on which defendant relies, has been overturned by Reyes. 
In State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, ^ j 25 n.l 1, 61 P.3d 1000, the Utah Supreme Court identified a 
three-part test "for reviewing the appropriateness of a reasonable doubt instruction." 
First, "the instruction should specifically state that the State's proof 
must obviate all reasonable doubt." Second, the instruction should 
not state that a reasonable doubt is one which "would govern or 
control a person in the more weighty affairs of life," as such an 
instruction tends to trivialize the decision of whether to convict. 
Third, "it is inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable doubt is not 
merely a possibility," although it is permissible to instruct that a 
"fanciful or wholly speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232 (citations omitted). 
The supreme court, however, revisited Robertson in State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 
116 P.3d 305. Reyes claimed that the reasonable doubt instruction given in his case "was 
improper" because it "fail[ed] to . . . 'specifically state that the State's proof must obviate 
all reasonable doubt' and [because it] improperly] inclu[ded] . . . the phrase 'doubt which 
is merely possible.'" Id. at \ 3. The court rejected Reyes's claims. Id. at \ 33, 35. 
The court first concluded that Robertson's "obviate all reasonable doubt" 
requirement was "both linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect." Id. at ^ 26. It was 
"linguistically opaque" because it "require[d] jurors to identify doubts and assess whether 
the evidence overcomes them." Id. It was "conceptually suspect" because, by requiring 
the jury to either "articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it" instead of being able to 
rely on some "unarticulated conviction that the State has failed to meet its burden of 
16 
proof," it "permitted] the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are 
sufficiently defined," thereby "improperly diminish[ing] the State's burden" of proof. Id. 
at ffif 27-28. The court, therefore, "expressly abandoned]" that Robertson requirement. 
Id atf 30. 
The court then addressed Robertson's statement that "'it is inappropriate to instruct 
that a reasonable doubt is not merely a possibility.'" Id. at fflf 7, 31-34. The court noted 
that the "fundamental objection to excluding 'mere possibility' from eligibility for 
consideration as reasonable doubt was that the term 'possibility,' standing alone, fails to 
disclose its location on the continuum marked at its extremes by impossibility and 
certainty." Id. at \ 31. The court "st[oo]d by this observation." Id. 
However, nothing in that observation, "[]or the Robertson test it spawned outlawed 
all references to 'possibilities' in defining reasonable doubt." Id. at ^  32. Indeed, 
Robertson itself "approv[ed] of language that 'fanciful or wholly speculative possibility 
ought not to defeat proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (citations and additional 
quotation marks omitted). Thus, "[w]hen complemented by appropriate qualifying and 
explanatory language, the use of the term 'mere possibility' in the definition of doubt 
does not create a reasonable likelihood that the jury would apply an unconstitutionally 
diminished standard of proof." Id. at ^ f 33. 
In Reyes's instruction, the court noted, "the exclusion of doubt which is 'merely 
possible' from consideration . . . is followed by the explanatory phrase 'since everything 
in human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.'" Id. (additional internal 
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quotation marks omitted). Such explanatory language "effectively neutralizes the risk 
that the reference to a 'mere possibility' will improperly lead a juror to apply a standard 
of proof lesser than a reasonable doubt." Id. Thus, the trial court did not err in including 
"mere possibility" language in the reasonable doubt instruction. Id. 
The court revisited Robertson again in State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, % 21, P.3d 
. Cruz confirmed that, after Reyes, "the Robertson test is no longer in force." Id. 
C. Reyes defeats defendant's "obviate all reasonable doubt" claim. 
Defendant claims that his counsel should have objected to the reasonable doubt 
instruction in this case because it did not include the "obviate all reasonable doubt" 
language required by Robertson. Aplt. Br. at 27. As discussed above, however, the 
supreme court recently overturned Robertson on this very issue. See Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 
Tf 30. Thus, defendant's claim fails under the Fretwell analysis. See Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 
372. 
D. Reyes defeats defendant's "mere possibility" claim. 
Defendant claims that counsel should have objected to the reasonable doubt 
instruction because it improperly included the "mere possibility" language proscribed by 
Robertson. Aplt. Br. at 27. Again, however, Reyes defeats defendant's claim. 
Under Reyes, an instruction may include "mere possibility" language so long as it 
also includes "appropriate qualifying and explanatory language" that "neutralizes the risk 
that the reference to a 'mere possibility' [would] improperly lead a juror to apply a 
standard of proof lesser than a reasonable doubt." Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at \ 33. In this 
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case, the "mere possibility" language in the reasonable doubt instruction was qualified by 
the following language: "A reasonable doubt is not one that is merely possible, fanciful or 
imaginary, because most everything relating to human affairs is open so some possible 
doubt" (R. 398). This language is essentially identical to that upheld in Reyes. See Reyes, 
2005 UT 33, ffif 32-33 (noting that Robertson itself "approved] of language that 'fanciful 
or wholly speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof beyond a reasonable doubt5" 
and that the Reyes instruction included "the explanatory phrase 'since everything in 
human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt."). Thus, defendant's 
reasonable doubt instruction claim fails. 
II.A. DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM ASSERTING 
ERROR IN THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS BASED ON 
ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY FAILS WHERE THE STATE DID NOT 
RELY ON ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY IN CONVICTING HIM 
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in not challenging the elements 
instructions as well as the instructions concerning accomplice liability. Aplt. Br. at 29-30, 
44-49. Defendant claims the elements instructions were erroneous because, "[w]hile all 
of the charges against Malaga were premised on accomplice liability, none of the 
elements instructions . . . required the government to prove the elements of accomplice 
liability." Id. at 29 (record citations omitted). He challenges the accomplice liability 
instructions as incomplete and misleading. Id. Neither of defendant's claims have merit. 
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1. Proceedings below. 
The information charged defendant with murder for the death of Amy Tavey and 
with aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit murder for 
crimes committed against Keith Williams (R. 76-79). Each of the four counts alleged that 
"the defendant, DARIUS PENI MALAGA, a party to the offense" committed the crime 
alleged (R. 76-77). Thus, each of the counts indicated that defendant could be found 
liable either as a principal in the crime or as an accomplice (Id.). 
At trial, however, the State never pursued defendant on the theory of accomplice 
liability. Rather, it identified defendant as a principal in the crimes for which he was 
charged. Thus, concerning Amy Tavey's death, the prosecutor stated in opening: 
In the early hours of Saturday, May 4th of 2002, Darius Malaga 
grabbed Amy Tavey from Silia Olive's car. He marched her down a 
wooded pathway next to the Jordan River. He forced her to kneel on 
the ground in front of him and he executed her. He rolled her body 
into the river and fled the scene. 
(R. 454:105, 112). Concerning the aggravated robbery charge, the prosecutor stated: 
Darius swung the handgun and hit Keith in the back of the head. 
Keith falls to the floor. And out from different places in the 
apartment come Anthony Lavulo, Tony Pita and Raymond Wallace. 
And they join Darius Malaga in beating Keith, in taking his 
possessions and duct taping him and pulling his beanie over his head. 
(R. 454:110). And, concerning the aggravated kidnapping and conspiracy to commit 
murder charges, the prosecutor stated: "Meanwhile,... Darius Malaga, Tony Pita, 
Anthony Lavulo and Raymond Wallace . . . take Keith out to Keith's car They put 
him in the trunk of the car and tell him they are going to kill him" (R. 454:110-11). 
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In closing, the prosecutor again emphasized the principal nature of defendant's 
liability. Thus, the prosecutor argued that defendant was a direct participant in the 
beating, robbing, and kidnapping of Boss (R. 459:991-92, 994-95,1012-13); that it was 
defendant who told Boss that "he was going to die" (R. 459:995); and that it was 
defendant who led Amy Tavey to the river and shot her (R. 459:998-99, 1002-03, 1009, 
1012-13, 1081). The only reference to accomplice liability was in connection with co-
defendant Olive's crime of felony murder, when the prosecutor referred to the accomplice 
liability instruction and argued that "Olive was a party to the aggravated robbery of Keith 
Williams" (R. 549:1009-10). 
At the end of trial, the jury received an elements instruction for each of the counts 
listed in the information (R. 379, 382, 384, 388). Consistent with the State's theory of 
principal liability, none of the instructions included the "party to the offense" language 
originally included in the information (Id). Thus, none of them allowed the jury to 
convict defendant based on accomplice liability (Id).4 
However, Instruction 22 did provide the jury with the statutory definition of 
accomplice liability because, the prosecutor argued in closing, such liability was relevant 
to co-defendant Olive's charge of felony murder (R. 358; Instr. 22; R. 549:1009-10). As 
requested by Olive's counsel, the jury was also instructed that "[m]ere presence at the 
4Although one of the instructions defining a lesser included offense did allude to 
accomplice liability (R. 394; Instr. 56), defendant was not convicted of the lesser offense. 
Thus, that jury instruction is not relevant to defendant's claim on appeal. 
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scene of the crime and knowledge that a crime is being committed are not sufficient to 
establish that the defendant aided and abetted the crime" (R. 351; Instr. 15; R. 633). 
2. Nothing requires that jury instructions include all the theories 
alleged in the information. 
Defendant claims that his counsel should have objected to the elements 
instructions because they did not address accomplice liability. Aplt. Br. at 48. State v. 
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170 (Utah App. 1992), and related cases defeat defendant's claim. 
In Ellifritz, Ellifritz was charged with one count of aggravated sexual assault. 835 
P.2d at 173. The information alleged that Ellifritz had committed the crime by "causing 
bodily injury to T.M. 'in the course of a rape or attempted rape, or forcible sodomy.5" Id. 
at 178 The jury instruction "use[d] the same wording found in the information except it 
substitute^] the words 'forcible sexual abuse, or attempted forcible sexual abuse' in 
place of 'forcible sodomy.'" Id. On appeal, Ellifritz claimed that "the trial court 
commi[ted] reversible error when it presented a jury instruction on aggravated assault that 
correctly stated the law but differed from the language in the information charging 
defendant." Id. at 173-74. This Court rejected defendant's claim. 
First, this Court noted that the information charging Ellifritz, in addition to 
alleging the facts of the crime, also cited to the statute defining the crime. Id. at 178. It 
then noted that the statute defining the crime identified forcible sexual abuse or attempted 
forcible sexual abuse as predicate crimes. See id. at 178 n.7. Finally, the Court noted that 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allow amendment of an information any time 
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before verdict so long as no different offense is charged and "the substantial rights of the 
defendant are not prejudiced." Id. at 178; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d) (allowing 
amendment of information "at any time before verdict if no additional or different offense 
is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced."). 
Given those facts, this Court held, any "alleged error in the jury instruction was not 
prejudicial." Id. at 179. Rather, "[i]f defendant had objected to the deviation in language, 
the information could easily have been amended to conform with the jury instruction." 
Id.; see also State v. Pederson, 2005 UT App 98, f 4, 110 P.3d 164 ("A trial court need 
not give jury instructions regarding elements unnecessary for the conviction of the 
charged crime.") (citation omitted); Harris v. State, 830 So. 2d 681, 684 (Miss. App. 
2002) (holding "it is not error for jury instructions to reflect a constructive amendment to 
an indictment," especially where "jury instruction simply remove[s] language that was 
unnecessary to prove the offense charged in the indictment"). 
Defendant's claim fails under this law. Simply stated, a reference to accomplice 
liability in the information did not obligate the State to rely on that theory at trial. See 
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 173-74, 178-79. Rather, where, as here, the State's sole theory of 
defendant's liability at trial was as a principal, any accomplice liability language in the 
information was surplusage "unnecessary to prove the offense-charged in the indictment." 
Harris, 830 So. 2d at 684. The removal of that language from the jury instructions, 
therefore, merely "reflects] a constructive amendment to [the information]." Id. 
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Because the instructions were proper, defendant's counsel was not ineffective in not 
challenging them. Thus defendant's claim fails. 
3. Where the instructions addressing accomplice liability were not 
relevant to defendant's convictions, defense counsel was not 
ineffective in not challenging them. 
Defendant claims that his counsel should have challenged the jury instructions 
defining accomplice liability as incomplete and misleading. Aplt. Br. at 29 (discussing 
instructions 15 and 22). Because defendant was not convicted under a theory of 
accomplice liability, however, he cannot show prejudice, even if the instructions were 
erroneous. See State v. Pirela, 2003 UT App 39, f 25, 65 P.3d 307 ('"If it is easier to 
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,... that 
course should be followed.'") (citation omitted). 
The failure of counsel to object to jury instructions is prejudicial "only if the 
likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high that it undermines our confidence in 
the verdict." State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, ffi| 20, 23, 20 P.3d 888 (affirming conviction 
where trial court's refusal to instruct jury on lesser included offense, though error, did not 
undermine confidence in verdict); see also State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, \ 23, 
989 P.2d 503 ("Even if we find error in the jury instruction, 'we will not reverse [a] 
defendant's conviction unless that error is harmful.'") (quoting State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d 
988, 990 (Utah App. 1993)) (alteration in original). 
No likelihood of a different outcome exists when the instruction, even if 
erroneous, "simply did not apply to the facts of th[e] case." Tinoco, 860 P.2d at 991 
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(holding that any error in instruction concerning one method of committing assault was 
harmless where State's evidence clearly did not implicate that method); see also State v. 
DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 198 (Utah App. 1987) (holding that error in accomplice liability 
instruction was harmless where instruction "was superfluous and not the basis of'jury's 
verdict); United States v. Glenn, 64 F.3d 706, 710 (D.C. 1995) (holding that erroneous 
instruction did not prejudice defendant because only implicated co-defendant). 
In such cases, there is "no real danger that [the defendant] would be convicted on 
the basis of [the inapplicable instruction] or that the jury was confused or misled by the 
instruction." United States v. Valencia, 907 F.2d 671, 688-89 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
failure to inform jury that instruction was relevant only to co-defendant was harmless 
where defendant "does not contend that the government argued [that theory] as a theory 
under which he might be found guilty"). 
Valencia is instructive. Valencia challenged the trial court's failure "to specify 
that the aiding and abetting instruction applied only to [his co-defendant]." 907 F.2d at 
689. Valencia argued that, "because the government's theory of the case was that [he] 
was the principal (and, presumably, [his co-defendant] was the accomplice), there was no 
one left for [defendant] to aid and abet." Id, The court rejected Valencia's claim 
because, "[throughout the government's case, Mr. Valencia's conduct was portrayed as 
that of a principal." Id. Thus, "the danger of Mr. Valencia's being convicted on the basis 
of the aiding and abetting instruction was so remote that any error in not limiting this 
instruction to co-defendant Martinez was harmless." Id. 
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In this case, the State's only theory was that defendant acted as a principal in the 
crimes charged (R. 454:105, 110-12, R. 459:991-92, 994-955, 998-99, 1002-03, 1009, 
1012-13, 1081). Consistent with that theory, each of the elements instructions under 
which defendant was convicted allowed his conviction only as a principal (R. 379, 382, 
384, 388). Thus, defendant was not prejudiced by the accomplice liability instructions, 
even if they were erroneous. See Valencia, 907 F.2d at 688-89; see also Tlnoco, 860 P.2d 
at 991; DeAlo, 748 P.2d at 198. Therefore, defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails, 
ILB. DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM ASSERTING 
ERROR IN THE MURDER INSTRUCTIONS FAILS WHERE THE 
STATE DID NOT RELY ON A DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE 
THEORY TO CONVICT DEFENDANT OF MURDER 
Defendant claims that his counsel should have objected to the murder elements 
instruction because it "omitted the element of depraved indifference, which was charged 
in this case, and included the element of unlawfulness, which is not an element of the 
murder charge." Aplt. Br. at 29-30. Defendant also claims that counsel should have 
challenged an instruction improperly defining "'grave risk of death,' which is an element 
of depraved indifference homicide." Id. at 30. Defendant's claims lack merit. 
1. Background. 
Count I of the amended information filed against defendant alleged that he 
[1] intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Amy Tavey; 
[2] and/or intending to cause serious bodily injury to Amy Tavey, 
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the 
death of Amy Tavey; and/or [3] acting under circumstances 
evidencing depraved indifference to human life, engaged in conduct 
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which created a grave risk of death to Amy Tavey, and thereby 
caused the death of Amy Tavey. 
(Id). Thus, the information identified three different theories under which defendant 
could be convicted. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2)(a), (b), (c) (Supp. 2002). 
At trial, however, the State's sole theory of liability was that defendant 
intentionally took Amy from Olive's car after Boss had escaped, that he intentionally took 
her to the Jordan River, and that he intentionally shot her (R. 454:105, 112; R. 459:998-
99, 1002-03, 1009, 1012-13, 1081). Consistent with the State's theory, the murder 
elements instruction provided that, to find defendant guilty, the jury had to find that he 
caused Amy's death "intentionally or knowingly" or that, "intending to cause serious 
bodily injury to another, he committed an act clearly dangerous to human life, which 
acted to cause the death of Amy Tavey" (R. 379; Instr. 41). The instruction did not make 
any reference to a "depraved indifference" theory or any "grave risk of death" (Id.). 
Despite the murder elements instruction, the next instruction provided: "As used in 
these instructions, 'grave risk of death' refers to the probability of the risk of death 
greater than just a 'substantial and justifiable' risk. A cgrave risk of death' means a 
highly likely probability that death will result from the risk that the defendant knowingly 
creates" (R. 380; Instr. 42). However, no other instruction used the term "grave risk of 
death" (R. 336-404). 
Finally, the murder instruction required—contrary to the statutory definition— 
proof that, when defendant committed the murder, he "did so unlawfully" (Id.). 
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2. Nothing requires that jury instructions include all the theories 
alleged in the information. 
As previously discussed, jury instructions are not erroneous merely because they 
do not include all the theories originally charged in the information. See State v. 
Pederson, 2005 UT App 98, \ 4, 110 P.3d 164; State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 178-79 
(Utah App. 1992); Harris v. State, 830 So. 2d 681, 684 (Miss. App. 2002). 
Here, the State at trial relied upon only two of the three murder theories originally 
charged in the information. Because the State did not rely on the depraved indifference 
theory originally charged, the trial court did not err in not including that theory in the 
murder elements instruction. See Pederson, 2005 UT App 98, f 4; Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 
178-79; Harris, 830 So. 2d at 684. Nor was counsel ineffective in not challenging the 
trial court's decision. Therefore, defendant's claim fails. 
3. Where the instruction defining "grave risk" was not relevant to 
defendant's murder conviction, counsel was not ineffective in not 
challenging it. 
As previously discussed, a defendant is not prejudiced by an erroneous jury 
instruction if there is "no real danger" that defendant was "convicted on the basis of [that 
instruction] or that the jury was confused or misled by the instruction." United States v. 
Valencia, 907 F.2d 671, 689 (7th Cir. 1990); see also State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d 988, 991 
(Utah App. 1993); United States v. Glenn, 64 F.3d 706, 710 (D.C. 1995). 
Here, defendant's information identified three statutory theories on which the 
murder charges were brought (R. 76-79). One of those theories was that defendant 
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caused Amy's death by depraved indifference (R. 76-79). The phrase "grave risk of 
death" is part of the statutory definition of depraved indifference murder. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203(c); see also Aplt. Br. at 30. 
However, defendant "does not contend that the government argued [depraved 
indifference] as a theory under which he might be found guilty," Valencia, 907 F.2d at 
689. Nor does he contend that the murder elements instruction allowed defendant to be 
convicted under that theory. See Aplt. Br. at 30-31. Thus, defendant has not shown why, 
as he claims, the "grave risk" instruction "muddied the waters" or "undoubtedly confused 
the jurors regarding the State's burden of proof in obtaining the murder conviction." Id. 
In fact, the grave risk instruction "simply did not apply to the facts of th[e] case." 
Tinoco, 860 P.2d at 991. Thus, defendant was not prejudiced by the instruction, even if it 
was erroneous. See Valencia, 907 F.2d at 688-89; see also Tinoco, 860 P.2d at 991; 
DeAlo, 748 P.2d at 198. Consequently, counsel was not ineffective in not challenging it. 
4. Defense counsel was not ineffective in not objecting to the extra 
element in the murder elements instruction where that extra 
element increased the State's burden of proof. 
Defendant claims his counsel was ineffective in not challenging the murder 
elements instruction where it "included the element of unlawfulness, which is not an 
element of the murder charge." Aplt. Br. at 29-30. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
A defendant is not prejudiced by incorrect jury instructions when the error 
"'increased the State's burden by adding another element to be proved.'" State v. Carruth, 
947 P.2d 690, 693 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Davis v. State, 916 P.2d 251, 260 (Okla. Ct. 
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Crim. App. 1996)), affd, 993 P.2d 869 (Utah 1999). Rather, "such an error actually 
benefits the defendant." Davis, 916 P.2d at 260. 
Defendant does not claim that the "unlawful" element of the murder charge 
lessened the State's burden of proof. To the contrary, if anything, the additional element 
increased the State's burden. Defendant's counsel, therefore, was not ineffective in not 
challenging that additional element. 
ILC. DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM ASSERTING 
ERROR IN THE CONSPIRACY INSTRUCTIONS FAILS WHERE 
THE INSTRUCTIONS AS A WHOLE ADEQUATELY 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THAT CRIME 
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective for not challenging the jury 
instructions on conspiracy because the instructions "did not accurately instruct the jurors 
on the elements of conspiracy, or inform them that a conspiracy conviction could not 
enter until the government proved each element of that offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Aplt. Br. at 31. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
"An accurate instruction upon the basic elements of the offense charged is 
essential, and the failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error." State v. Laine, 618 
P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Cf. State v. 
Casey, 2003 UT 55, \ 46-50, 82 P.3d 1106 (holding error in elements instruction was 
harmless). However, "[s]o long as the jury is informed what each element is and that 
each must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the instructions taken as a whole may be 
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adequate even though the essential elements are found in more than one instruction." 
Laine, 618 P.2d at 33; see also State v. Tuckett, 2000 UT App 295, Tf 9, 13 P.3d 1060. 
Here, the elements of conspiracy to commit murder were set out in two 
instructions. Instruction 50 provided that, to convict defendant of conspiracy to commit 
murder, the jury had to find "beyond a reasonable doubt" that, on or about May 4,2002, 
he "conspired to intentionally or knowingly cause the death of Keith Williams" (R. 388; 
Instr. 50). Instruction 51 then set out the statutory definition of conspiracy: 
A person is guilty of conspiracy when he, intending that 
conduct constituting a crime be performed, agrees with one or more 
persons to engage in or cause the performance of the conduct and 
any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy, 
except where the offense is a capital felony, a felony against the 
person, arson, burglary, or robbery, the overt act is not required for 
the commission of conspiracy. 
(R. 389; Instr. 51). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (Supp. 2001). 
These instructions are essentially indistinguishable from those upheld in State v. 
Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, 64 P.3d 1218. There, Hobbs claimed that his conviction for 
aggravated robbery had to be reversed because the aggravated robbery jury instruction 
"did not include a definition of robbery within it." Id. at 131. This Court rejected 
Hobbs's claim because, although the aggravated robbeiy instruction—which outlined 
those elements the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt—did not include a 
definition of robbery within it, the very next instruction did. Id. Thus, "[r]ead as a whole 
the instructions adequately defined [aggravated] robbery." Id. 
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Here, instructions 50 and 51, read together, identified for the jury all the elements 
that it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict defendant of conspiracy 
to commit murder. See Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, \ 31. Therefore, defense counsel was 
not ineffective in not challenging these instructions. 
III. DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM ASSERTING 
ERROR IN THE INSTRUCTION CONCERNING CO-
DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY FAILS WHERE THE INSTRUCTION 
WAS A PROPER STATEMENT OF THE LAW 
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to a jury 
instruction discussing co-defendant Olive's testimony. Defendant claims that, by 
directing "the jurors to treat [Olive's] testimony as they would that of any other 
witness's," the instruction "undercut [his] rights to confrontation and to defend against 
the charges" because "Olive was not any other witness," but rather "was an accomplice" 
and "informantf]." Aplt. Br. at 33-34. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
A. Relevant instructions. 
The jury was given four instructions relevant to defendant's claim. First, the jury 
was given a general instruction concerning "the weight of the evidence, the credibility of 
the witnesses and the facts" (R. 344; Instr. 8). Although indicating that "[t]here is no firm 
rule the Court can give you for determining the truthfulness 8tnd credibility of witnesses," 
the instruction identified various factors the jury "may consider," including "the 
witnesses' motive for testifying, if any, and of course, the interest or lack of interest the 
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witness may have in the outcome of the case, and the extent to which, if any, such interest 
may have affected or colored his or her testimony" (Id). 
The next instruction addressed informant testimony. That instruction directed the 
jury "that the testimony of an informer who provides evidence against a defendant at the 
request of the government must be examined and weighed by you with greater care than 
the testimony of an ordinary witness," and identified for jurors several factors they 
"should consider" in determining the informer's credibility (R. 345; Instr. 9). 
The next instruction addressed how the jury should regard a defendant's testimony: 
You are instructed that the Defendant is a competent witness 
in one's own behalf and the Defendant's testimony should be 
received and given the same consideration as you give to that of any 
other witness. The fact that the Defendant stands accused of a crime 
is no evidence of guilt or innocence and is no reason for rejecting the 
Defendant's testimony. You should weigh the Defendant's 
testimony the same as you weigh the testimony of any other witness. 
(R. 346; Instr. 10). 
The final instruction provided that, "[i]n deciding whether to believe testimony 
given by an accomplice, you should use greater care and caution than you do when 
deciding whether to believe testimony given by an ordinary witness" (R. 355; Instr. 19). 
The instruction warned that an accomplice's testimony "may be strongly influenced by 
the hope or expectation that the prosecution will reward testimony that supports the 
prosecution's case by granting the accomplice immunity or leniency" (Id.). It also 
advised the jury to "bear in mind the accomplice's interest in minimizing the seriousness 
of the crime and the significance of the accomplice's own role in its commission, [which] 
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may show the inside knowledge about the details of the crime [that then allows the 
accomplice] to construct plausible falsehoods about it" (Id.). 
B. The instructions as a whole allowed defendant to argue his case 
to the jury. 
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in not objecting to instruction 10 
because that instruction directed the jury to consider co-defendant Olive's testimony as it 
would any other witness. See Aplt. Br. at 33. Defendant claims that the instruction 
"undercut" his "rights to confrontation and to defend against the charges." Id. 
In support of his claim, defendant cites numerous authorities recognizing a 
defendant's "right to present his defense" and "to have the jury instructed clearly and 
comprehensibly on his theory of the case." Aplt. Br. at 32, n.l 1. He also cites authorities 
recognizing the appropriateness of accomplice and informant instructions where such 
persons testify for the State and either the testimony by such persons is uncorroborated or 
the witnesses receive some benefit for their testimony. See id. at 33 n.12. However, none 
of the authorities cited by defendant address, let alone directly support, his claims that an 
instruction like that given here concerning a co-defendant testimony violates a 
defendant's rights to confrontation and to present a defense. 
Nor has the State found any such authority. To the contrary, the authority found by 
the State tends to support the instructions given in this case. See Wimberly v. State, 423 
S.E.2d 728, 729 (Ga. App. 1992) ("[I]f [a] co-defendant appears as a witness at trial, he 
may testify against his co-defendant or co-conspirator and such testimony is to be treated 
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as all other evidence."); see also People v. Alvarez, 926 P.2d 365, 403-04 & n.23 (Cal. 
1996) (approving instructions that told jury both that "testimony of a defendant ought not 
be viewed with distrust simply because it is given by a defendant" and that accomplice 
testimony ought to be viewed with distrust: "Under the law, a defendant is surely equal to 
all other witnesses. But, under the same law, he is superior to none.").5 
Moreover, as defense counsel's opening and closing arguments make clear, the 
instructions as a whole were—contrary to defendant's contention, see Aplt. Br. at 
32—more than adequate to protect defendant's "right to present his defense" that Olive's 
testimony should be considered with caution. See R. 454:128 (asserting that none of the 
State's witnesses will be credible, noting, "They all have self-serving goals, Silia Olive 
included"; "It will not surprise you tha t . . . she will disclaim culpability"); R. 459:1044-
45 (asserting that jurors have heard "a very confusing, contradictory hodgepodge of self-
serving stories from uncredible drug addicted criminals eager to keep from being 
suspects. . . . They were contradicting everything, and Lia more—at least as much as 
everybody else"). 
5In fact, to the extent jurisdictions take issue with jury instructions directed at co-
defendants, their difficulty appears to be more with accomplice-type instructions than 
with the like-any-other-witness instruction given here. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 403 So. 
2d 585, 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that "accomplice instruction is not 
appropriate where defense testimony has been given . . . by one of two defendants tried 
jointly" because "doubt and suspicion are improperly cast upon one defendant's 
exculpatory testimony on his own"); State v. Okumura, 894 P.2d 80, 105 (Haw. 1995); 
State v. Land, 794 P.2d 668, 671 (Kan. App. 1990); People v. Reed, 556 N.W.2d 858, 862 
(Mich. 1996); but see People v. Box, 5 P.3d 130, 167 (Cal. 2000). 
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Because the instructions as a whole were adequate for defendant to present his 
defense, defendant's ineffectiveness claim based on them fails. 
IV, DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM ASSERTING 
ERROR IN THE CAUSATION INSTRUCTION FAILS WHERE 
DEFENDANT NEVER ARGUED THAT AN INTERVENING CAUSE 
LED TO THE VICTIM'S DEATH 
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in not challenging the murder 
causation instruction. See Aplt. Br. at 35-39. Defendant contends the instruction "was 
deficient, because it failed to define or otherwise inform the jury about the concept of 
intervening cause." Id. at 36. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
"It is . . . axiomatic that where the defendant [asserts] a defense to . . . [a] criminal 
charge, and where there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to support i t , . . . the jury 
should be charged regarding it.55 State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33, 34-35 (Utah 1981). 
However, "[wjhere . . . there is no reasonable basis in the evidence to support the defense 
or its essential components, it is not error for the trial judge to either refuse to instruct the 
jury as to the defense, or to instruct them to disregard it." Id. at 34; see also State v. 
Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1980). 
In this case, Instruction 41 provided that, to find defendant guilty of murder, the 
jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant "caused the death of Amy 
Tavey" (R. 379). Instruction 43 then defined the phrase "[cjaused the death of another": 
"Caused the death of another" means the death of the victim 
resulted proximately from some act or omission on the part of the 
defendant. 
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The proximate cause of an injury or death is that cause, which 
in a natural and continuous sequence, and which is unbroken by an 
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which 
the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause—the one 
that necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the 
injury. 
One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to 
have caused the death of another if the injury contributes 
immediately or mediately to the death of such other. 
It is not indispensable to a conviction that the wounds 
inflicted by the actor be fatal and the direct cause of death. It is 
sufficient that they cause death indirectly through a chain of natural 
effects and causes unchanged by human action. The fact that other 
causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of 
responsibility, provided such other causes are not the sole proximate 
cause of the death 
(R. 381; Instr. 43) (emphasis added). 
Defendant challenges Instruction 43, claiming that it was improper in light of the 
instructions approved of in State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479 (Utah 1984). See Aplt. Br. at 
37,47. In Lawson, defendant was convicted of automobile homicide and driving under 
the influence causing bodily injury. On appeal, Lawson claimed that the jury instructions 
on comparable negligence and intervening cause were confusing because they "required 
[the] jury not to consider the court's instruction on proximate cause." Lawson, 688 P.2d 
at 482. The supreme court's analysis of Lawson's claim consisted of one paragraph in 
which the court concluded that the instructions given, including the instruction 
"advis[ing] the jury of the concept of intervening cause," "adequately set forth the state of 
the law as it applies to this case." Id. 
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In his brief, defendant implies that Lawson defined the "appropriate" intervening 
cause instruction that must be given "when causation is at issue in a criminal case." Aplt. 
Br. at 37, 47. However, Lawson did not, in fact, mandate that any specific intervening 
cause instruction be given in every case. Thus, Lawson does not support defendant's 
ineffective assistance claim. 
In any case, defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by the lack of a more 
exact intervening cause instruction. Defendant's defense at trial was not—as defendant 
now suggests, see Aplt. Br. at 38-39—that, although he took Amy from the car on the 
night she died, another person unforeseeably came upon them afterwards and killed Amy. 
Rather, his defense was that somebody else took Amy from the car and killed her. The 
first defense implicates an intervening cause that saves defendant from liability despite an 
initial wrongful act by him. The second does not. Because the second does not and 
because it is the second defense that defendant pursued at trial, defense counsel had no 
reason to object to the causation instruction given. 
Furthermore, the instruction given did not, as defendant claims, allow the jury to 
convict defendant of murder based "on the jurors' incorrect belief that his taking her from 
the car was enough to convict him of the murder." Aplt. Br. at 39. First, the instruction 
defines a proximate cause as "that cause, which in a natural and continuous sequence, and 
which is unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without 
which the result would not have occurred" (R. 381). Merely removing Amy from a car 
and leading her off does not rise to the level of a proximate cause under this definition 
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because no reasonable jury would believe that, "in a natural and continuous sequence," 
such an act would "produce the injury," i.e. Amy's death. 
Second, the remainder of the instruction informs the jury that the proximate cause 
must be a cause that actually "inflicts" an injury on the victim (R. 381). Thus, the 
instruction explains, "[o]ne who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to have 
caused the death of another if the injury contributes immediately or mediately to the death 
of such other." And it explains that "[i]t is not indispensable to a conviction that the 
wounds inflicted by the actor be fatal and the direct cause of death" if they "cause death 
indirectly through a chain of natural effects and causes unchanged by human action" (Id.). 
Again, merely removing Amy from a car and leading her off would not constitute 
proximate cause under these explanations because neither action inflicted wounds upon 
Amy. Rather, some additional human action—in this case, gun shots—was required to 
cause Amy's death. Thus, this instruction did not allow conviction of defendant for 
murder even if "the jurors had a reasonable doubt about whether one of the other people 
involved unexpectedly opted to kill Tavey." Aplt. Br. at 39. 
Finally, the instruction in this case was more favorable to defendant than the 
instruction given in Lawson. By focusing on the infliction of an actual wound on Amy, 
the causation instruction given here presumes that the initial wrongful act at issue was the 
shooting of Amy. Thus, if defendant did not shoot Amy, he could not be held liable for 
her death under this instruction. 
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In contrast, the Law son instruction defines a much broader spectrum of events 
from which to consider proximate cause. For example, the Lawson instruction would 
have allowed the jury to find proximate cause based on negligence, whether or not such 
conduct directly caused Amy's injury or death. See Aplt. Br. at 37 (quoting "intervening 
cause instruction approved of in the Lawson negligent homicide case"). Thus, arguably, 
the Lawson instruction—unlike the one actually given—would have allowed the jury to 
commence its analysis with defendant's taking Amy out of the car. 
Second, the Lawson provides that for another human act to constitute an 
independent intervening act, the second person could not be "a party to this case," nor 
could the defendant "have [reasonably] anticipated" the other person's act "in the exercise 
of ordinary care." See id. Here, defendant's defense was that another member of his 
group killed Amy during the same criminal episode in which defendant had earlier 
participated. Thus, the second person upon whom defendant's defense rested was clearly 
"a party to this case" and one whose actions defendant could have reasonably anticipated. 
Therefore, under the facts of this case, a Lawson-type instruction would have 
increased the likelihood—not decreased it, as defendant contends—that the jury would 
have convicted defendant of murder even had "one of the other people involved . . . opted 
to kill Tavey." Aplt. Br. at 39. 
Because defendant has not shown that the causation instruction given in this case 
was inadequate, let alone erroneous, defendant has also not shown that his counsel was 
ineffective in not challenging the instruction. 
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V. DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM ASSERTING 
ERROR IN THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTION FAILS WHERE 
COUNSEL HAD A STRATEGIC REASON FOR NOT 
CHALLENGING IT 
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in not challenging the jury's 
flight instruction where that instruction did not advise the jury '"that (1) there may be 
reasons for flight fully consistent with innocence, and (2) even if consciousness of guilt is 
inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged.'" . 
Aplt. Br. at 40 (quoting State v. Howell, 761 P.2d 579, 580 n.l (Utah App. 1988) (citing 
State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 575 (Utah 1983)). Because defense counsel had a strategic 
reason for not challenging the instruction, however, defendant's claim fails. 
As previously stated, to demonstrate counsel ineffectiveness, a defendant must 
show both that his counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment and that counsel's performance prejudiced 
him. See State v. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79, \ 14, 34 P.3d 187. 
In assessing whether trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard 
of reasonable professional judgment, this Court "must keep in mind 'the variety of 
circumstances faced by defense counsel [and] the range of legitimate decisions regarding 
how best to represent a criminal defendant.'" State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 
1990) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)); see also Parsons v. 
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994). Because this Court "give[s] trial counsel wide 
latitude in making tactical decisions," this Court "will not question such decisions unless 
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there is no reasonable basis supporting them." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 
1996) (quoting Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995)) (emphasis added). 
Thus, to succeed on a claim that trial counsel performed deficiently, defendant 
must "rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action 
might be considered sound trial strategy." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19, 12 P.3d 
92 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Stated otherwise, a claim that 
counsel performed deficiently must rest on more than mere failure to object when counsel 
has a basis to do so. Defendant must also show that counsel's decision not to object had 
"no reasonable basis supporting [it]." Crosby, 927 P.2d at 644 (citation omitted); see also 
State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41, ^ 40-44, 48 P.3d 931 (holding failure to object to 
objectionable evidence was not deficient performance where omission was part of trial 
strategy); State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989) (same); State v. Bloomfield, 
2003 UT App 3, f 31, 63 P.3d 110 (same); State v. Villarreal 857 P.2d 949, 955-56 (Utah 
App. 1993) (same), affdby 889 P.2d 419, 427 (Utah 1995). 
"Flight instructions are proper when supported by the evidence." State v. Riggs, 
1999 UT App 271, K 9, 987 P.2d 1281; see also State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 575 (Utah 
1983). However, to be complete, a flight instruction must also include the following two 
admonitions: "that there may be reasons for flight fully consistent with innocence and that 
even if consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect actual 
guilt of the crime charged." Bales, 675 P.2d at 575; see also State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 
34, 39 (Utah 1987); State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579, 580 n.l (Utah App. 1988). 
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In this case, the flight instruction did not specifically include either of the 
admonitions discussed in Bales, 675 P.2d at 576 (R. ; Instr. 12). However, such 
omission does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to object 
to the omission unless defendant can also show that counsel had no strategic reason for 
not objecting. See, e.g., Pecht, 2002 UT 41, ffif 40-44; Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, f 31. 
Absent such a showing, defendant has not rebutted the "strong presumption that under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, at f^ 19 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Defendant does not and cannot make that showing here. 
First, nothing in the record suggests that defendant had an innocent motive for 
going to Las Vegas after the crimes in this case were committed. To the contrary, as 
defendant's counsel acknowledges in closing argument, the evidence does suggest that 
defendant was guilty of at least some crimes during the episode (R. 459:1061 (suggesting 
defendant should possibly "be charged with obstruction of justice or tampering with 
evidence" for role in disposing of Boss's car; also conceding that "[i]f he assaulted Keith 
at any time, that's wrong")). Given this evidence and defendant's concession on appeal 
that his flight "showed his desire to avoid arrest," Aplt. Br. at 49, defendant's trial 
counsel may have reasonably concluded that he had no evidentiary basis upon which to 
argue—and therefore no reason to request an instruction providing—that "there may be 
reasons for flight fully consistent with innocence." Bales, 675 P.2d at 575. 
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Second, the flight instruction given in this case directed the jury both (1) to 
"consider the motive which prompted th[e] flight, if any is shown" in determining 
significance of the evidence of flight; and (2) that any "inference which may be drawn 
from such flight, as to its strength and weakness, depends upon the facts and 
circumstance surrounding the defendant at the time59 (R. 348; Instr. 12). Defense counsel 
may have reasonably concluded that, although not setting forth the second Bales 
requirements verbatim, the instruction was nonetheless sufficient to allow counsel to 
argue that defendant's fleeing to Las Vegas reflected only a consciousness of guilt for 
some—not all—of the crimes charged. 
In any case, defendant cannot show he was prejudiced by counsel's decision, even 
if it was deficient, because the evidence of defendant's guilt was substantial. First, 
numerous witnesses—including a relative stranger, Kelli Kershaw—testified as to 
defendant's participation in the crimes for which he was convicted (R. 454:157-58, 168-
69, 175, 179, 214, 219; R. 455:303, 310, 375-81, 383, 386-88, 411, 477, 481-84; R. 456: 
540, 565-71, 573, 577-78, 602, 643, 649-53, 656; R. 457:823, 842, 844-45, 853, 872, 885, 
887-89). Second, defendant's friend Loleni Tuaone testified that, the day after the 
murder, defendant admitted shooting a woman and then rolling her into the river (R. 
456:612, 614-16). Finally, after defendant was arrested in Las Vegas, he admitted to 
police that he had assaulted Boss, taped Boss up and put Boss in the trunk of Boss's car 
(R. 456:643, 650-53, 656). He also admitted being near the Jordan River that night (R. 
456:643, 650-53). Against this evidence, defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced 
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by the flight instruction, even if the instruction was not as complete as it could have been. 
Thus, defendant also cannot show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object 
to the instruction, even if such failure constituted deficient performance. 
Consequently, defendant's ineffectiveness claim fails.6 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT MAKING FINDINGS 
CONCERNING MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES BEFORE 
IMPOSING THE MAXIMUM MANDATORY SENTENCE FOR 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING WHERE THE RECORD SUPPORTS 
THE COURT'S LACK OF FINDINGS 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error when it failed to find 
defendant's age and the existence of strong family support as mitigating factors before 
sentencing defendant to the maximum minimum mandatory sentence for aggravated 
kidnapping. Aplt. Br. at 43-44, 49. Alternatively, defendant claims his counsel was 
ineffective in not objecting to the lack of such findings. See Aplt. Br. at 2, 44. 
Defendant's claims fail because the record supports both the trial court's and counsel's 
decisions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(7) (West 2004) governs the imposition of minimum 
mandatory sentences. Under that statute, a defendant convicted of a crime which carries 
with it minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment "shall" be sentenced to "the term of 
middle severity unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(7)(a). "In determining whether there are circumstances that 
6Because defendant has not shown any errors in the jury instructions given, he also 
necessarily has not shown that "the erroneous jury instructions require a new trial" 
"[u]nder the cumulative error doctrine." Aplt. Br. at 40 & n. 13. See 
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justify imposition of the highest or lowest term," the court may consider the record in the 
case, pre-sentence investigation and other similar reports, statements presented by the 
prosecution or the defendant, "and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing 
hearing." Id. § 76-3-20l(7)(c). In addition, the court "shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the 
Sentencing Commission." Id. § 76-3-20 l(7)(e). "The court shall [then] set forth on the 
record the facts supporting and reasons for imposing the upper or lower term." Id. § 76-
3-201(7)(d). 
Under the plain language of the statute, a trial court is not required to make 
specific findings identifying the mitigating and aggravating factors considered. See id. 
However, case law has imposed such a requirement. Thus, ",[t]o impose the greater or 
lesser mandatory minimum sentence, the trial court must (1) identify the mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances and (2) state the reasons for whichever minimum mandatory 
sentence is imposed." State v. Simmons, 2000 UT App 190, ^ 19, 5 P.3d 1228 (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
"Concomitantly, any mitigating or aggravating circumstance found by the trial 
court must be supported by evidence, and the proponent of the circumstance bears the 
burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Moreno, 
2005 UT App 200, f 13, 113 P.3d 992. "A mitigating factor is proven when the evidence 
is substantial, uncontradicted, and there is no reason to doubt its credibility." State v. 
Kemp, 569 S.E.2d 717, 723 (N.C. App. 2002) (citations, internal quotation marks, and 
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alterations omitted). "One witness' conclusory testimony as to the existence of a 
[mitigating factor] is unsubstantial and insufficient to clearly establish the factor and does 
not compel a finding of the mitigating factor." Kemp, 569 S.E.2d at 723. 
A. Defendant's plain error claim fails where the evidence supports 
the trial court's lack of findings. 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error in sentencing him to the 
maximum minimum mandatory term for aggravated kidnapping when it failed to find "as 
mitigating circumstances that [defendant'] has strong family support and is young." Aplt. 
Br. at 42, 43, 49. Defendant claims that "[t]he trial court's failure to make the necessary 
findings with regard to mitigating factors, and failure to weight the aggravating and 
mitigating factors prior to selecting the maximum term of fifteen years to life, require 
resentencing." Aplt. Br. at 42. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
To establish plain error, defendant must show that (1) the trial court erred; (2) the 
error should have been obvious; and (3) the error was prejudicial. See State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (1993). Defendant cannot show error, let alone obvious error, here. 
First, in arguing that the trial court should have found his age a mitigating factor, 
defendant relies on State v. Strung 846 P.2d 1297(Utah 1993). See Aplt. Br. at 42-43. 
Defendant, however, is not Strunk. 
In Strunk, the defendant was a sixteen-year-old with no criminal past. Strunk, 846 
P.2d at 1300. In contrast, defendant was twenty years old at the time he committed these 
crimes. In addition, defendant had an extensive juvenile record—including a prior 
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adjudication for aggravated robbery and several parole violations—as well as a theft 
conviction as an adult. Finally, defendant was described by his parole officer as "a 
dangerous young man [who] should go to prison for life" (R. 446:PSI at 1, 7-8, 9). 
As this Court stated in State v. Moreno, age "should be considered as mitigating 
when a defendant is very young and unsophisticated." State v. Moreno, 2005 UT App 
200, Tf 14, 113 P.3d 992. Defendant here, unlike Strunk, was neither very young nor 
unsophisticated. Therefore, the trial court did not err, let alone obviously err, under 
Strunk, in not finding defendant's age a mitigating factor. 
Alternatively, defendant claims that the trial court obviously erred in not finding 
defendant's familial support as a mitigating factor. Again, however, the record defeats 
defendant's claim. The only evidence concerning defendant's family support consisted of 
defendant's own statement to the presentence investigator that "all members of his family 
are saddened by his present circumstances, but remain loving and supportive of him" (R. 
446:PSI at 113). A trial court need not make findings favorable to a defendant based 
solely on that defendant's self-serving statements. See Moreno, 2005 UT App 200, \ 14. 
Moreover, defendant's statement of familial support is contradicted by additional 
facts set forth in the very same paragraph of defendant's PSI—that "[n]o letters were 
received on the defendant's behalf and that "attempts to contact his mother and older 
brother were unsuccessful, as the number provided by the defendant has been 
disconnected" (R. 446:PSI at 113). Where, as here, the record concerning the factor is 
"subject to some dispute," a "trial court act[s] well within its discretion in discounting or 
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ignoring [alleged mitigation evidence] and in not accepting them as mitigating 
circumstances for its sentencing decision." Moreno, 2005 UT App 200, f 17. 
Based on this record, then, defendant cannot show error, let alone obvious error, in 
the trial court's decision not to find defendant's age and alleged familial support as 
mitigating factors. 
B. Defendant's ineffectiveness claim fails where the record supports 
counsel's decision. 
Alternatively, defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in not objecting to 
the trial court's decision not to find defendant's age and his alleged familial support as 
mitigating factors. See Aplt. Br. at 49. However, where, as here, the record does not 
support such findings, see pp. 47-48 supra, defendant has not overcome the strong 
presumption that counsel's decision was a sound strategic one. See Litherland, 2000 UT 
76, \ 19. Therefore, defendant's claim fails. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the 
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 
2005 UT 18, Tf 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the 
litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 
560 (Cal. 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided 
by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
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Addendum A 
United States Const, Amend. VI 
Amendment VI. Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
Utah Const, Art. I, § 12 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in 
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause 
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
